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DUE PROCESS: VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF MINORS-Bartley v.
Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
"Children's Rights in Mental Commitments Expanded in
Landmark Federal Case Holding Pennsylvania Practice Unconstitutional." This is the title of a press release by the Mental Patient
Civil Liberties Project' immediately following the decision of
Bartley v. Kremens.2 The release optimistically predicts that the
Bartley decision will have a major impact on the rights of juveniles
in "voluntary" commitment proceedings. David Ferleger, Esquire, 3
stated in the release:
For the first time, a federal court has declared that children are not
second-class citizens in the eyes of the Constitution simply because
someone says the child is "crazy."
The abuses of psychiatry and the overuse of mental institutions will
certainly be curbed if the Court's order is obeyed. This opinion recognizes the life-long damage which is inflicted on a child once he or she
is stuck with the label of "mental patient."'
Until now, children committed to mental institutions by their
parents had no claim to due process. No child had standing to object
to his/her commitment, nor was any child's interest protected when
it came into direct conflict with the interests of the parents. Although the Bartley decision appears to provide solutions to the
problems which have been encountered in dealing with the "voluntary" commitment of juveniles,5 many important questions must be
answered before its full impact can be measured. What will be the
result if there is no direct conflict between the interests of the parents and those of the child? What are the requirements in commitment proceedings which constitute due process? Will these same
1. Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project, Press Release, July 1975.
2. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
3. Mr. Ferleger is the Director for the Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project as well as
counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.
4. Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project, Press Release, July 1975.
5. There is a technical distinction between voluntary commitment and voluntary admittance in Pennsylvania. Voluntary commitment refers to a procedure whereby the prospective patient and the psychiatrist enter into an agreement which provides for a definite commitment period. Some adult patients select this procedure because they can maintain a
voluntary status and are entitled to the respective benefits afforded adult patients. Psychiatrists may enter into such an agreement to insure that the patient stays in the facility for a
minimal period of time. Voluntary admittance refers to a procedure which is initiated by the
consent of the individual to be committed or of his/her parents. One argument in support of
this procedure is that a volunteer will be more eager for treatment. For full discussion of the
subtle differences between the phrases mentioned above see Comment, Hospitalizationof
Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: The Mental Health - RetardationAct of 1966, 71 DICK.
L. REV. 300, 308-17 (1967). For purposes of this note the terms will be used interchangeably.
231
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requirements be applied to all situations? Will other states with
similar commitment practices adopt the approach espoused by the
Bartley court? In other words, will the plan devised by the court in
Bartley remedy the abuses of the "voluntary" commitment statutes?'

I.

THE BARTLEY DECISION

The Bartley case involves a class action instituted by children
under 19 years of age who have been committed or might be committed7 to a state mental facility. The plaintiffs sought to have a
three-judge federal panel' declare §§402 and 4031 of the Pennsyl6. It must be remembered that the federal courts have treated due process as a flexible
concept, the content of which "varies according to specific factual contexts." Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
7. On April 29, 1974, the court determined this was a proper class action. 402 F. Supp.
1039, 1041, n. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
8. Jurisdiction was determined by invoking 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C.
§1983 1970, Act of April 20, 1871 ch. 22, §1 17 Stat. 13.
9. 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§4402, 4403 1966:
Section 402. Voluntary admission; application, examination and acceptance; duration of admission.
(a) Application for voluntary admission to a facility for examination, treatment and
care may be made by:
(1) Any person over eighteen years of age.
(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be
admitted, if such is eighteen years of age or younger.
(b) When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need
of care or observation, he may be admitted.
(c) Except where application has been made under the provisions of Section 402
(a)(2) and the person is still eighteen years of age or younger, any person voluntarily
admitted shall be free to withdraw at any time. Where application has been made
under the provisions of Section 402 (a)(2), only the applicant or his successor shall be
free to withdraw the admitted person so long as the admitted person is eighteen years
of age or younger.
Section 403 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 provides
in part:
Section 403. Voluntary commitment; application, examination and acceptance; duration of commitment.
(a) Application for voluntary commitment to a facility for examination, treatment
and care may be made by:
(1) Any person over eighteen years of age.
(2) A parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to the person to be
admitted, if such person is eighteen years of age or younger.
(b) The application shall be in writing, signed by the applicant in the presence of at
least one witness. When an application is made, the director of the facility shall cause
an examination to be made. If it is determined that the person named in the application is in need of care or observation, he shall be committed for a period not to exceed
thirty days. Successive applications for continued voluntary commitment may be
made for successive periods not to exceed thirty days each, so long as care or observation is necessary.
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vania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act unconstitutional
and to have the state enjoined from using those provisions when
entertaining applications for "voluntary" admission' 0 of juveniles
into State mental health facilities. Plaintiffs' arguments were based
upon alleged violations of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
Ultimately, the court held §§402 and 403 of the Pennsylvania mental health act facially unconstitutional. To remedy the lack of due
process in Pennsylvania's "voluntary" commitment procedures the
court prescribed the following safeguards:
(1) a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours from the date
of initial detention;
(2) a post-commitment hearing within two weeks from the date of
initial detention;
(3) written notice, including the date, time, and place of the hearing, and a statement of the grounds for the proposed commitment;
(4) counsel at all significant stages of the commitment process and
if indigent the right to appointment of free counsel;
(5) presence at all hearings concerning proposed commitment;
(6) a finding by clear and convincing proof that there is need for
institutionalization;
(7) the rights to confront and to cross-examine witnesses, to offer
evidence in own behalf, and to offer testimony of witnesses. 2
II.

ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

One presiding federal judge evaluated the situation in Bartley
aptly when he stated that the matter involved "a very difficult and
sensitive problem."' 3 The court first had to determine whether or
not the plaintiffs were entitled to the procedural safeguards of due
process under the fourteenth amendment.' 4 Whenever an individual

is subjected to a deprivation of constitutional rights and the grievous loss of liberty, adequate procedural safeguards of due process
(c) No person voluntarily committed shall be detained for more than ten days after
he has given written notice to the director of his intention or desire to leave the facility,
or after the applicant or his successor has given written notice of intention or desire to
remove the detained person.
10. Admissions may be accomplished by parents, guardians, or a person standing in
loco parentis to the person to be admitted.
11. The decision in Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) was based
on a due process argument advanced by the plaintiffs.
12. 402 F. Supp. at 1053.
13. Evening Bulletin, May 11, 1973, at B-13, col. 4 (Gibbons, J., quoted).
14. Although due process is a flexible concept, the factual situation presented in the
case must fall within the property and liberty language of the fourteenth amendment. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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must be afforded.' 5 As the decision of Dixon v. Attorney General"
clearly indicates, the state is required to provide such safeguards
when there is a possibility of wrongful deprivation of one's liberty
by commitment to mental institutions. In the words of Huyett:
These safeguards attempt to protect persons from an arbitrary or
erroneous deprivation of liberty or property, whether that deprivation
be imposed for benevolent or punitive reasons."
As a logical extension of the above mentioned principles the court
found that the injuries alleged in the Bartley case did fall within the
parameters of the fourteenth amendment.
The initial determination that due process safeguards were
applicable to the Bartley case only provided the court a basis from
which to work, i.e., to determine what process was due the plaintiffs.
The court then found itself thrust into the midst of an ongoing
debate concerning the priorities to be assigned the interests of the
various parties involved. Traditionally, the concept of parental control over a child has permeated our legal reasoning.' Time and time
again the federal courts have reiterated the proposition that the
family unit's integrity must be preserved." Therefore, courts have
held that the parents could control the destiny of an unemancipated
minor.2 0 To state the principle simply, many courts have acted on
the assumption that the parents always act in the best interests of
the child. Slowly, with the advent of decisions like In re Sippy,2'
support for the proposition of giving absolute deference to parental
judgment is being eroded. Bartley may be seen as the culmination
of the erosion of this proposition.
It stands to reason that a parent may not always be acting in
the best interest of a child when having that child committed to a
mental health facility. Notwithstanding the ease with which "voluntary" commitment can be effected,22 there are many other factors
influencing a parent's decision to commit the juvenile in question.
For example, the moment of decision-making may be one of great
emotional stress.2 3 In these situations there is a great need for objec15. 402 F. Supp. at 1045 citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
16. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
17. 402 F. Supp. at 1045.
18. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
20. Rule v. Geddes, 23 App. D.C. 31 (1904).
21. 97 A.2d 455 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
22. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental
Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ellis].
23. 48 NoT DAME L. REV. 133, 139 (1972).
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tivity and expertise. The majority in Bartley found that a child's
interest must be fully considered, but the court was careful not to
preclude all considerations of the parents' interests." The inference
to be drawn is that a balance must be struck between the conflicting
interests of the child and the parents by a disinterested review of
the situation.25
Similarly, the Bartley court rejected the argument that the
state's role as parens patriae would afford sufficient protection for
the juvenile to be committed." It was conceded by the court that
the state does have an interest in protecting the mental well-being
of a child, preserving the family unit, and protecting society, but
that these interests do not require the courts to ignore the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7 Thus, a balance should
be struck between the varying interests of the parties involved in the
Bartley case. No longer should the interests of a child be subordinated to those of the parents or the state. It appears that this balance might be attained through the safeguards prescribed by the
8
Bartley court, e.g., a probable cause hearing.
III.

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS ENUNCIATED IN BARTLEY COMPARED
TO AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY

Once the Bartley court decided that the fourteenth amendment
was applicable to the factual situation presented and that a child's
interests should not be subordinated to those of the parents or the
state, it set forth the specific requirements of due process which had
29
to be met in Pennsylvania's "voluntary" commitment proceedings.
By establishing certain safeguards to be applied whenever a "voluntary" commitment procedure is initiated, this court was seeking to
put an end to the abuses of the typical commitment procedure."
However, the question still remains: Are the safeguards announced
24. 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 and n. 12 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
25. It does not appear that a staff psychiatris'provides the disinterested review needed.
Ellis at 863-66.
26. The parens patriae argument advanced in Bartley was based on the fact that the
state is not an adversary party. Therefore, the state will protect the child and his/her interests
when deciding whether or not to commit that child to a mental institution. The state also
argues that because it is not an adversary the children cannot complain of the alleged deprivation. 402 F. Supp. at 1046.
27. 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 and n. 12 (1975).
28. All hearings required by the court will be held before the courts until the legislature
devises a plan for unbiased tribunals to provide review by conducting the hearings.
29. See p. 233 supra.
30. A primary example of an abuse of a "voluntary" commitment procedure is a parent
committing a mongoloid child to Polk State Hospital because the rest of the family wanted
to go on a vacation. 402 F. Supp. at 1044.
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by the majority in Bartley an appropriate means for reaching the
desired goal?
The procedural requirements in Bartley seem to embody the
full spectrum of safeguards established in precedent such as Lynch
32
and Dixon v. Attorney General.33
v. Baxley,3' Heryford v. Parker,
This prescription of due process by the Bartley court goes a long way
in providing a juvenile protection from any arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, i.e., confinement, but the safeguards come into effect only
after the child has been confined for some length of time not exceed34
ing 72 hours.
In theory it appears that an even more effective method of
protecting a child's interests can be established before any confinement. This method would require the appointment of a guardian ad
litem and an independent psychological examination of the child.
Such a theory finds indirect support in both Dixon v. Attorney
3
General and Horacek v. Exon. 1
The Dixon case involved the recommitment of individuals after
their original confinement (based upon criminal conduct) was terminated.3 7 During the disposition of that case the District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania deemed it proper for a guardian
38
ad litem to be appointed to oversee the various plaintiffs' interests.
The court also held that in preparation for a hearing the individual
39
in question was entitled to independent and expert examination.
40
Similarly, in Horacek, the Nebraska district court deemed it
appropriate to appoint a guardian ad litem. To quote that court:
In view of the possibility that the interests of the parents bringing the
action under the civil rights act on behalf of their children confined
in a state home for the mentally retarded, might conflict with those
of their children residing at home, the discreet course would be to
appoint a guardian ad litem who would not displace the parents as
31. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (due process included notice, probable cause
hearing, and right to counsel).
32. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (due process in this case included that one be fully
advised of his/her rights and be entitled to counsel).
33. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971)(due process in this case included that one be
advised of his/her rights, right to counsel, entitled to full hearing, and entitled to confront
witnesses).
34. 402 F. Supp. at 1053.
35. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
36. 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973).
37. The Dixon case held 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. §4404 (1966) unconstitutional.
38. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
39. Id. at 974.
40. This suit was brought under the civil rights act to remedy poor conditions at various
state mental health facilities.
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representatives of the plaintiff children but would be alert to recognize potential and actual differences in position.4
The appointment of a guardian after the parent has made his
decision to commit the child and before any confinement would
serve several purposes. Initially, the guardian would review the factual situation and inquire into the motivation behind the decision
to commit the youth. There is the possibility that the parent may
be dissuaded from committing the child when the guardian does not
find commitment in the best interests of the child. If the parent is
not dissuaded, then the guardian would assume the role of protector
of the child's rights. At this point the guardian could request an
independent and expert examination" of the child. The guardian
may also seek out legal counsel to represent the child. Approaching
the problem in this manner would eliminate the flagrant abuses of
the "voluntary" commitment procedures immediately. No longer
would a child be placed in a mental institution because his family
wants to go on a vacation43 or because the child watches too much
television."
There appears to be no good reason to wait until a child is
committed to provide protection for his/her rights. Indeed the damage may already have been done with the commitment of the individual, however temporary, i.e., being forced to carry the stigma of
having been a mental patient. The above-mentioned guardian
theory provides a solution to this problem, whereas the Bartley
court's prescription of due process seems to fall short of its goal. Its
prescription does not appear to contemplate children being incapable of understanding the complex problems that they might face. If
a child is too mentally immature to comprehend the situation, then
it is unlikely that the same child will want to test the validity of the
commitment. Under the guardian theory the guardian will have
recognized the problem and will have taken the appropriate action
on behalf of the juvenile.
It seems as though the guardian theory would be an effective
means of reaching the desired goal, i.e., to eliminate the abuses of
the "voluntary" commitment procedures. However, there are practical problems which may be insurmountable. First of all, assuming
that there has been an increase in the number of "voluntary" com41.
42.
at 870.
43.
44.

357 F. Supp. at 74.
For a full discussion of the role that an independent psychiatrist can play, see Ellis
402 F. Supp. at 1043.
The Philadelphia Inquirer, October 7, 1973, at p. 1, col. 4 (Sunday ed.).
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mitments proportional to the increase in the number of young people in the population of mental hospitals,45 will there be enough
qualified people willing to act as guardians? One could argue that
since every child who is "voluntarily committed" is entitled to legal
counsel, the solution is to have legal counsel double as a guardian
ad litem. Although this argument is not without its merit, one of the
most obvious reasons for not proceeding in this manner is that counsel may not have the desire or expertise to assume a dual role. This
may be one reason that courts such as the Bartley court have not
incorporated into their thinking a theory similar to the guardian
theory presented here."
If implemented, the guardian theory may eliminate flagrant
abuses of the "voluntary" commitment procedures, but it may also
discourage parents from seeking help for a child with a mental disorder. This is precisely the result the Bartley court wanted to avoid.
Such a lengthy and complex procedure for the commitment of a
child in need of care may have a counter-therapeutic effect. This is
the major reason advanced by psychiatrists and psychologists for
keeping mental commitment proceedings out of the courts.47
Finally, who will pay the guardians for their services? If the
parents are required to pay, they will have to pay someone to advocate against their interests. This does not make sense either logically or practically. As evidenced by the aforementioned arguments
opposing the implementation of the guardian theory, the Bartley
court has supplied the most substantial protection that can practically be afforded a child in a "voluntary" commitment proceeding.
IV.

POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE BARTLEY DECISION

The civil commitment provision in §406 of the Pennsylvania
statute41 presents the first major restriction upon the impact of this
decision. It provides a vehicle for effectively circumventing the postcommitment hearing as well as the other due process safeguards
announced by the court. Under §406 the supervisor of the institution
45. Kay, Farnham, Karren, Knakel and Diamond, Legal Planning For The Mentally
Retarded: The California Experience, 60 CAL. L. REV. 438, 516 (1972).
46. Another interesting theory was implemented by the federal court in Saville v.
Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). This plan provided for a three-member board
to screen applications made by parents to voluntarily admit their child. The theory supporting this plan parallels the guardian ad litem theory presented in this note in that it provides
due process prior to any confinement as well as effectively screening frivolous applications
for commitment.
47.

Ellis, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840 (1974).

48. 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. §4406 (1966). Section 406 permits involuntary detention of persons
upon petition to the state court of common pleas.
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of commitment can initiate a civil commitment proceeding. As a
result, there is the possibility that a child's status may be changed
from "voluntary" to involuntary, thus escaping the teeth of the
Bartley decision. The plaintiffs did not challenge §406; therefore,
the court was unable to pass upon the issue. Not until §406 is reconciled with Bartley, i.e., ruled unconstitutional or amended legislatively in order to meet the procedural safeguards required by this
court, can the full impact of Bartley be felt. It provides only partial
protection for the constitutional rights of juveniles.
The Supreme Court has never decided the issue of due process
in "voluntary" commitment proceedings49 and Bartley only establishes the law for the state of Pennsylvania. It has no binding effect
upon any other state. Therefore, the impact of Bartley v. Kremens
is far from reaching the "major" proportions suggested by the press
release published by the Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project
50
mentioned above.
Due to the restrictive impact of this decision, steps must be
taken to further protect the rights of juveniles in "voluntary" commitment proceedings not only in Pennsylvania, but in all of the
other states which have "voluntary" commitment statutes.5 ' The
Bartley court has done an admirable job in establishing a method
for protecting juveniles. As evidenced by the fact that the court
could not pass on the constitutionality of §406, it is apparent that
judicial innovation is very limited. The most effective way to solve
the problems presented here is to have the legislature promulgate
new legislation recognizing the rights and needs of the children af52
fected.
Daniel N. Kosanovich
49. Bartley v. Kremens has been docketed for review by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 44 U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976).
50. See page 231 supra.
51. Many other states have similar voluntary commitment statutes, See e.g., Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 91/2, §§5-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); Ind. Ann. Stat. §22-1205 (Burns Supp. 1973);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §330.19(a) (Supp. 1973).
52. Journal Herald, Feb. 18, 1976, p. 21, col. 2. This newspaper article suggests that
Ohio has just enacted new legislation giving mentally retarded individuals many needed
rights.
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